March 4, 2011
Huffington Post
Wednesday's Washington Post featured a heart-wrenching article by Greg Jaffe on Marine Lt. Gen. John Kelly and his son's death on the battlefield in Afghanistan's Helmand Province. The article clearly struck a chord and was among the most widely shared articles of the day. Although not its central theme, the article extensively quotes the speech in which Gen. Kelly addressed the meaning of "support" for soldiers in combat.
From the article:
"Their struggle is your struggle," he told the ballroom crowd of former Marines and local business people. "If anyone thinks you can somehow thank them for their service and not support the cause for which they fight -- our country -- these people are lying to themselves... More important, they are slighting our warriors and mocking their commitment to this nation."
And speaking of the soldiers, "They hold in disdain those who claim to support them but not the cause that takes their innocence, their limbs and even their lives,' he said.
In addition to the issue's emotional weight, part of what makes the conversation about supporting soldiers in combat so difficult is the absence of a shared understanding of "support." Effective communication is nearly impossible without at least a mutual understanding of how the communicating parties define key terms. Even if the two sides don't agree on one definition, they must understand what the terms mean to one another. In this case, this understanding is all the more important given the emotional character of the issue, and the sensitivity of both sides to perceived judgments.
Soldiers have a unique but generally shared understanding of the term, not widely understood by those without a personal connection to those in uniform. While not uniformly held, in my estimation this is the view of the majority of servicemen with combat experience.
Soldiers go where our country's civilian leaders tell them to go, in pursuit of the objectives those officials determine to be in our country's national interest. To those soldiers, the time for spirited debate is before they are ordered into combat. Up to that point, one can legitimately claim to be supporting the soldiers by vociferously opposing their deployment, by lobbying political decision makers, and by attempting to demonstrate a lack of public support for the mission's objectives.
At that point, there is no congruence between supporting the soldiers and supporting the mission, because if the opposition is successful in its efforts, the soldier doesn't go to war. The opposition's success does not undermine the soldier's efforts, encourage his enemy, or demean his sacrifices.
That is not true once the government sends the soldier into combat. Once our volunteer soldier deploys, his sole purpose is to achieve the objectives he is ordered to secure by our elected leaders. In fact, every soldier swears an oath that defines their duty, to "obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me." The soldier, more than anyone else, wants these orders to be well-considered, valid, popular objectives that are worthy of his sacrifices.
Once he receives these orders, he wants to accomplish these objectives as quickly and as decisively as possible. Every delay exposes him to further danger and risks the mission. Once he is so engaged, "supporting" him necessarily means sharing this desire for victory, defined as successfully fulfilling the mission.
At that point, if the opposition is successful in its efforts, there are very real negative consequences to the soldier on the battlefield. Such opposition actively interferes with his pursuit of his objectives and makes an already dangerous and difficult mission even more difficult and dangerous. Undermining public support for the effort, delegitimizing the mission, and declaring victory unattainable make it tougher for the soldier to decisively achieve his objectives by emboldening the enemy, damaging morale, and undermining political leadership. Therefore, from this perspective, there is a logical and inherent contradiction in claiming to "support" the soldier while taking actions that undercut his efforts.
This is particularly true for the protracted, unstructured war in which we are engaged, where public and political support are critical elements of success.
One might argue that this is an idealistic and naive vision of the process by which our leaders decide to send soldiers into harm's way. That may be true today, but it need not be. Regular elections remain the greatest check on our country's leadership and government policy, and voters should demand consideration on matters of such importance.
It may not always be possible to hold extensive debates, as with preventive strikes, true emergencies, or covert actions. But there is nothing that prevents opposition to the military's efforts, the political leaders responsible for the decision, or the objectives pursued. However, those active opponents should at least recognize that their "support" is likely not recognized as such by soldiers holding this view. To them, it just doesn't make sense to claim to "support" those whose purposeful efforts you undermine, even unintentionally.
This seems unfair to those who feel they "support" the soldier because they don't want him to suffer any harm for a cause they don't believe is worth the sacrifice. They contrast their stance to the Vietnam-era demonization of soldiers and object to the perceived blurring of that line. There are many patriotic, good-hearted Americans who feel this way, and who won't accept the perspective described here. They don't have to. But if we're ever going to close this "great divide" between the military and civilian worlds, we must first understand each other.
Friday, March 4, 2011
Monday, December 28, 2009
Flex-Cuffing Ourselves: The Criminal Justice Paradigm for Detention Operations
[Note: I submitted this essay for the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA) 2009 essay contest. The MOAA panel selected the essay as one of three finalists, and it won the contest after a month of open online voting. I was proud to donate the top prize of $1,000 to the recovery fund of my friend Blake Smith, a Marine helicopter pilot recently injured in Afghanistan. You can read more about Blake here.]
In 2006 I served as a convoy commander with 3d Battalion, 3d Marines during a seven-month deployment to Haditha, Iraq. I was responsible for transporting scores of detainees from our area of operations (AO) to the Regimental detention facility at Al Asad. We felt every second of each two-hour drive down the western bank of the Euphrates River. Every moment we stared ahead intently at the road, fully aware of what might happen, and hoped our mission was worth it. These detainees often showed up again on our streets in the following weeks, and many Marines felt exasperated and betrayed. What was the point, they’d ask? Why risk our lives going on raids and transporting detainees across our AO only to see them released in a matter of days or weeks? We called it the “catch and release” program, and it crushed morale.
This is the unheard voice in the current discussion about the future of the United States’ military detainment policy, the voice of the grunt. When considered, it can bring a valuable measure of reality to esoteric philosophical debates and political rhetoric. While lawyers, activists, and politicians argue about balancing American values, international opinion, and strategic objectives, those who execute these policies watch with trepidation. Our experience demonstrates that shifting to a criminal justice framework for military detentions during combat operations will significantly increase the danger to U.S. troops and dramatically decrease their effectiveness.
The criminal justice framework makes the combat environment hazier rather than clearer. Even under the most lenient of protocols, detentions would be subject to myriad technical challenges on the validity or sufficiency of evidence, interpretations of rights and jurisdictions, and the legality of “arrests” and time limits for detention. The individual grunt and his team leader, already conducting the most difficult small-unit operations in our history, would be burdened with substantial evidence-gathering requirements and exceedingly restrictive rules of engagement.
During my first tour in Iraq in 2006, we already required documentation such as photographs, witness testimony, and lengthy reports for every detainee. These requirements were time consuming and tedious, and they pushed the limits of tactical feasibility. Combined with the frequency of detainee releases, the process could be incredibly frustrating to team leaders and platoon commanders anxious to secure an area from constant unseen threats. Asking more for less is change in the wrong direction.
Proponents of the criminal justice approach argue that adjustments can and will be made to accommodate the realities of the combat environment. This is doubtful considering the legal limitations of adjusting our criminal justice system while utilizing its courts, but even if it were true, the result would be a patchwork policy with a flimsy foundation. Inventing a system that confuses our warfighters, restricts their tactical capabilities, and breeds inefficiency through loopholes and technicalities does not constitute an improvement.
The alternative to criminal prosecution is the law of war construction, which uses the international law of armed conflict as the backbone of a system that acknowledges the differences between military operations and domestic law enforcement. All combatants have clearly defined rights and responsibilities under the law of armed conflict, and there are clear guidelines that illustrate the relationship of these rights and responsibilities. Rights are maintained by those who abide by their responsibilities. Because of this, there are clear incentives to abide by the law’s parameters, a fact that both we and our enemies understand quite well.
Perhaps the most significant benefit of this framework is that it is designed for combat operations, and therefore ties together the various dimensions of detention operations with a comprehensive policy and common language. Among other rights, these internationally accepted guidelines give us the explicit right to hold enemy combatants until the completion of hostilities. This may or may not be in our best tactical or strategic interests, but under this system we have the right to make that determination, not civilian courts. Rules of engagement are determined by commanders who understand the necessities on the ground, the parameters of allowable conduct, and the moral imperatives represented by the American public through their elected officials. Unlike the criminal justice paradigm, this system can easily adapt to a variety of conflicts without dramatically changing its core components.
To the grunt, this debate is not philosophical. The decision to shift to a criminal justice framework for detention policy would not only undermine the effectiveness of military detentions, it would needlessly and dramatically heighten the risks for those who already shoulder the heaviest burden.
In 2006 I served as a convoy commander with 3d Battalion, 3d Marines during a seven-month deployment to Haditha, Iraq. I was responsible for transporting scores of detainees from our area of operations (AO) to the Regimental detention facility at Al Asad. We felt every second of each two-hour drive down the western bank of the Euphrates River. Every moment we stared ahead intently at the road, fully aware of what might happen, and hoped our mission was worth it. These detainees often showed up again on our streets in the following weeks, and many Marines felt exasperated and betrayed. What was the point, they’d ask? Why risk our lives going on raids and transporting detainees across our AO only to see them released in a matter of days or weeks? We called it the “catch and release” program, and it crushed morale.
This is the unheard voice in the current discussion about the future of the United States’ military detainment policy, the voice of the grunt. When considered, it can bring a valuable measure of reality to esoteric philosophical debates and political rhetoric. While lawyers, activists, and politicians argue about balancing American values, international opinion, and strategic objectives, those who execute these policies watch with trepidation. Our experience demonstrates that shifting to a criminal justice framework for military detentions during combat operations will significantly increase the danger to U.S. troops and dramatically decrease their effectiveness.
The criminal justice framework makes the combat environment hazier rather than clearer. Even under the most lenient of protocols, detentions would be subject to myriad technical challenges on the validity or sufficiency of evidence, interpretations of rights and jurisdictions, and the legality of “arrests” and time limits for detention. The individual grunt and his team leader, already conducting the most difficult small-unit operations in our history, would be burdened with substantial evidence-gathering requirements and exceedingly restrictive rules of engagement.
During my first tour in Iraq in 2006, we already required documentation such as photographs, witness testimony, and lengthy reports for every detainee. These requirements were time consuming and tedious, and they pushed the limits of tactical feasibility. Combined with the frequency of detainee releases, the process could be incredibly frustrating to team leaders and platoon commanders anxious to secure an area from constant unseen threats. Asking more for less is change in the wrong direction.
Proponents of the criminal justice approach argue that adjustments can and will be made to accommodate the realities of the combat environment. This is doubtful considering the legal limitations of adjusting our criminal justice system while utilizing its courts, but even if it were true, the result would be a patchwork policy with a flimsy foundation. Inventing a system that confuses our warfighters, restricts their tactical capabilities, and breeds inefficiency through loopholes and technicalities does not constitute an improvement.
The alternative to criminal prosecution is the law of war construction, which uses the international law of armed conflict as the backbone of a system that acknowledges the differences between military operations and domestic law enforcement. All combatants have clearly defined rights and responsibilities under the law of armed conflict, and there are clear guidelines that illustrate the relationship of these rights and responsibilities. Rights are maintained by those who abide by their responsibilities. Because of this, there are clear incentives to abide by the law’s parameters, a fact that both we and our enemies understand quite well.
Perhaps the most significant benefit of this framework is that it is designed for combat operations, and therefore ties together the various dimensions of detention operations with a comprehensive policy and common language. Among other rights, these internationally accepted guidelines give us the explicit right to hold enemy combatants until the completion of hostilities. This may or may not be in our best tactical or strategic interests, but under this system we have the right to make that determination, not civilian courts. Rules of engagement are determined by commanders who understand the necessities on the ground, the parameters of allowable conduct, and the moral imperatives represented by the American public through their elected officials. Unlike the criminal justice paradigm, this system can easily adapt to a variety of conflicts without dramatically changing its core components.
To the grunt, this debate is not philosophical. The decision to shift to a criminal justice framework for detention policy would not only undermine the effectiveness of military detentions, it would needlessly and dramatically heighten the risks for those who already shoulder the heaviest burden.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Embedded and Unvarnished
A Marine lieutenant’s book provides a bracingly candid picture of Iraq.
By Gabriel Ledeen
"Everyone’s Iraq is different.” Veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom use that saying to describe the great variety of experiences encountered by those who served there. There are many reasons for this phenomenon. Timing is one important factor: Someone who deployed in 2003 might not have much in common with someone who served in the same area in 2006. Location is critical, as well: My tour in Haditha in 2006 was quite different from a buddy’s tour at the same time in Rawah, or another’s in Baghdad. One’s unit can be determinative, but even more important is the individual’s job. The point is: What you hear about Iraq will largely be determined by the individual to whom you are listening.
I raise this point partly as an introduction and partly as a warning to my review of Wesley Gray’s stimulating new book, Embedded: A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army. I served in Haditha with the battalion that supported Gray’s team for several months of its deployment. As explained above, my own experience differed substantially from Gray’s by virtue of the differences in our jobs and responsibilities. If I can learn a great deal about my own area of operations from this book, I’m sure it has much to offer readers of disparate backgrounds.
This book’s value lies in the uniqueness of Gray’s experience, and his remarkably clear-eyed recognition of that uniqueness. Wes was a Marine lieutenant, embedded with an Iraqi Army unit for seven months as the intelligence officer for a Military Training Team (MTT). Its mission, like that of most MTTs, was to train and advise its assigned Iraqi Army unit and prepare that unit’s members to assume full responsibility for the security of their country. Unlike most American servicemen assigned to MTTs, Lt. Gray spoke nearly fluent Iraqi Arabic. He had graduated from the University of Pennsylvania with a degree in finance and was working on his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago when he joined the Marine Corps in 2004.
Gray’s Arabic skills, and his awareness of his unique position, helped him to understand his Iraqi counterparts in a way that others could not. He eventually became “Mulazzim Jamal,” the Iraqi rank (roughly equal to lieutenant) and name given to him by his Iraqi comrades whose trust and friendship Gray had earned. The result is an eye-opening book that gives the reader a view of Iraqi psychology and society in raw form, one that is vastly different from what one finds in analytical texts.
Unlike most other books of this genre, Embedded was not co-authored with an established professional writer. As a result, the writing and organization don’t flow quite as smoothly as one would like, and Gray’s personal and professional opinions can be a bit heavy-handed. On the other hand, the book is brutally honest; this Marine pulls no punches. There are no attempts at equivocation, and it is clear that Gray prides himself on his straight talk and honesty.
The conversations Gray recounts are priceless and make a fascinating study for anyone trying to understand the war, the Iraqis, or Iraqi society. Here are a few excerpts from Gray’s conversations with Iraqi soldiers:
“In Iraq, it is mandatory to beat your wife! To not beat your wife is considered unmanly. Men who do not beat their women allow their women to take advantage of them through their powers of seduction. I think Western pressure to stop wife beating will only lead to a systematic weakness in Iraqi men.”
“First Division is paid at a higher rate than everyone in our division because their pay officers know even more people than Captain Tseen does at the Ministry of Defense. Americans like to call this corruption. We call this getting things done. . . . All pay officers skim pay. Why do you think being the pay officer is such a highly regarded position in the Iraqi Army?”
“Jamal, there is a beating chain of command in Iraqi society. The oldest males sit at the top of the chain of command and the youngest sit at the bottom . . . Say you are around the dinner table and the youngest son calls the oldest son a weakling. The eldest son, the middle son, and the father, whose honor and respect have been violated, are obligated to beat the offender. And the instigator is obligated to let the beatings happen without a struggle . . . [If they didn’t,] this would effectively show the community that the males of the household can’t even take care of their own internal affairs.”
“The only Marine I have seen that really understood Iraqi people was Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani, the 3/1 commander. Do you know what happened to him? The Marines fired him for the ‘Haditha Massacre.’”
After one such conversation, Gray considers the consequences of these major cultural differences. “If Martin is correct, it will be difficult to accomplish our strategic mission in Iraq of creating a peaceful, stable, and democratic-based government that serves the people, especially if we let them decide how to do things. Paradoxically, if we let the Iraqis do things the way they want to do them, it means Iraq will end up as a tyrannical military dictatorship again. This would bring us full circle. And if we confine the Iraqis to using our methods, they will end up in the same situation our troops find themselves in: asking the locals where the IED makers are and getting blank stares.”
This was in 2006, when al-Anbar was considered “unwinnable” by the top intelligence officers in the province, but Gray’s concerns are perhaps even more relevant today in light of our ongoing early withdrawal from Iraq and the elusiveness of a definition of victory.
Gray’s sense of humor about his unusual, and at times absurd, situation keeps the pages turning and brings an authentic Marine voice to his narrative. Marines may be the funniest group of people I’ve ever encountered, and Gray channels that institutional quality masterfully. In one of his adventures, Gray rescues two 18-year-old male Marines from a crowd of Iraqi admirers. One Iraqi says to Gray, “Jamal, those two Marines are pretty and we want to have sex with them in the hut. We want to show them who is boss.” He turns to the two Marines and says, “Gents, the Iraqis think you’re cute and want to take you behind a swahut [barracks]. I’m going to get you guys the hell out of here before this gets out of hand.”
After evacuating the two distressed Devildogs, Gray is again accosted by the amorous Iraqi soldiers. This time he says to their ringleader, “Ayad, I realize you are too ugly to get women and must resort to men. If you need me to help you get some Iraqi women, let me know and I’ll make a few phone calls.” The Iraqis love the joke, and the ringleader hugs him through the window of his barricaded truck, “Jamal, you are an Iraqi. We love you.” You couldn’t make this stuff up if you tried.
Wes Gray’s Embedded is a raw yet thoughtful account of his profoundly interesting experience, told from an honest and intelligent perspective. This is a book for anyone who wants to see Operation Iraqi Freedom from the point of view of our “main effort,” the Military Training Teams, a perspective we have lacked for too long.
By Gabriel Ledeen
"Everyone’s Iraq is different.” Veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom use that saying to describe the great variety of experiences encountered by those who served there. There are many reasons for this phenomenon. Timing is one important factor: Someone who deployed in 2003 might not have much in common with someone who served in the same area in 2006. Location is critical, as well: My tour in Haditha in 2006 was quite different from a buddy’s tour at the same time in Rawah, or another’s in Baghdad. One’s unit can be determinative, but even more important is the individual’s job. The point is: What you hear about Iraq will largely be determined by the individual to whom you are listening.
I raise this point partly as an introduction and partly as a warning to my review of Wesley Gray’s stimulating new book, Embedded: A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army. I served in Haditha with the battalion that supported Gray’s team for several months of its deployment. As explained above, my own experience differed substantially from Gray’s by virtue of the differences in our jobs and responsibilities. If I can learn a great deal about my own area of operations from this book, I’m sure it has much to offer readers of disparate backgrounds.
This book’s value lies in the uniqueness of Gray’s experience, and his remarkably clear-eyed recognition of that uniqueness. Wes was a Marine lieutenant, embedded with an Iraqi Army unit for seven months as the intelligence officer for a Military Training Team (MTT). Its mission, like that of most MTTs, was to train and advise its assigned Iraqi Army unit and prepare that unit’s members to assume full responsibility for the security of their country. Unlike most American servicemen assigned to MTTs, Lt. Gray spoke nearly fluent Iraqi Arabic. He had graduated from the University of Pennsylvania with a degree in finance and was working on his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago when he joined the Marine Corps in 2004.
Gray’s Arabic skills, and his awareness of his unique position, helped him to understand his Iraqi counterparts in a way that others could not. He eventually became “Mulazzim Jamal,” the Iraqi rank (roughly equal to lieutenant) and name given to him by his Iraqi comrades whose trust and friendship Gray had earned. The result is an eye-opening book that gives the reader a view of Iraqi psychology and society in raw form, one that is vastly different from what one finds in analytical texts.
Unlike most other books of this genre, Embedded was not co-authored with an established professional writer. As a result, the writing and organization don’t flow quite as smoothly as one would like, and Gray’s personal and professional opinions can be a bit heavy-handed. On the other hand, the book is brutally honest; this Marine pulls no punches. There are no attempts at equivocation, and it is clear that Gray prides himself on his straight talk and honesty.
The conversations Gray recounts are priceless and make a fascinating study for anyone trying to understand the war, the Iraqis, or Iraqi society. Here are a few excerpts from Gray’s conversations with Iraqi soldiers:
“In Iraq, it is mandatory to beat your wife! To not beat your wife is considered unmanly. Men who do not beat their women allow their women to take advantage of them through their powers of seduction. I think Western pressure to stop wife beating will only lead to a systematic weakness in Iraqi men.”
“First Division is paid at a higher rate than everyone in our division because their pay officers know even more people than Captain Tseen does at the Ministry of Defense. Americans like to call this corruption. We call this getting things done. . . . All pay officers skim pay. Why do you think being the pay officer is such a highly regarded position in the Iraqi Army?”
“Jamal, there is a beating chain of command in Iraqi society. The oldest males sit at the top of the chain of command and the youngest sit at the bottom . . . Say you are around the dinner table and the youngest son calls the oldest son a weakling. The eldest son, the middle son, and the father, whose honor and respect have been violated, are obligated to beat the offender. And the instigator is obligated to let the beatings happen without a struggle . . . [If they didn’t,] this would effectively show the community that the males of the household can’t even take care of their own internal affairs.”
“The only Marine I have seen that really understood Iraqi people was Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani, the 3/1 commander. Do you know what happened to him? The Marines fired him for the ‘Haditha Massacre.’”
After one such conversation, Gray considers the consequences of these major cultural differences. “If Martin is correct, it will be difficult to accomplish our strategic mission in Iraq of creating a peaceful, stable, and democratic-based government that serves the people, especially if we let them decide how to do things. Paradoxically, if we let the Iraqis do things the way they want to do them, it means Iraq will end up as a tyrannical military dictatorship again. This would bring us full circle. And if we confine the Iraqis to using our methods, they will end up in the same situation our troops find themselves in: asking the locals where the IED makers are and getting blank stares.”
This was in 2006, when al-Anbar was considered “unwinnable” by the top intelligence officers in the province, but Gray’s concerns are perhaps even more relevant today in light of our ongoing early withdrawal from Iraq and the elusiveness of a definition of victory.
Gray’s sense of humor about his unusual, and at times absurd, situation keeps the pages turning and brings an authentic Marine voice to his narrative. Marines may be the funniest group of people I’ve ever encountered, and Gray channels that institutional quality masterfully. In one of his adventures, Gray rescues two 18-year-old male Marines from a crowd of Iraqi admirers. One Iraqi says to Gray, “Jamal, those two Marines are pretty and we want to have sex with them in the hut. We want to show them who is boss.” He turns to the two Marines and says, “Gents, the Iraqis think you’re cute and want to take you behind a swahut [barracks]. I’m going to get you guys the hell out of here before this gets out of hand.”
After evacuating the two distressed Devildogs, Gray is again accosted by the amorous Iraqi soldiers. This time he says to their ringleader, “Ayad, I realize you are too ugly to get women and must resort to men. If you need me to help you get some Iraqi women, let me know and I’ll make a few phone calls.” The Iraqis love the joke, and the ringleader hugs him through the window of his barricaded truck, “Jamal, you are an Iraqi. We love you.” You couldn’t make this stuff up if you tried.
Wes Gray’s Embedded is a raw yet thoughtful account of his profoundly interesting experience, told from an honest and intelligent perspective. This is a book for anyone who wants to see Operation Iraqi Freedom from the point of view of our “main effort,” the Military Training Teams, a perspective we have lacked for too long.
Friday, June 12, 2009
War Supplemental
Fighting for the War Supplemental
NRO The Corner - June 12, 2009
Yesterday I joined Senator Graham, Senator Lieberman, and Representative Conway at the podium of a press conference on the “war supplemental.” Both senators are fighting furiously to make sure that the bill includes the provision that prohibits the release of the photographs allegedly documenting detainee abuse. It was a privilege to participate in the press conference with them. Here is what I said:
I served two tours in Iraq as an officer in a marine infantry battalion. I was a convoy commander in the Haditha area of Al-Anbar province in 2006, so I know from personal experience the kind of impact, both positive and negative, congressional politics can have on the battlefield. I recall two specific incidents. The first was obviously Congressman Murtha’s comments on the so-called Haditha incident. The second was an appropriations bill, similar to this one we are discussing now, that narrowly passed by two votes. These statements damaged troop morale, encouraged our enemies, and unnerved potential friends, and allies among the local population.
Here you have a bill funding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some Democrats oppose it simply because they don’t want to vote for a continuation of these wars, or these battlefronts of the larger war, however you see it, even with President Obama in charge of them. Fine. Other Democrats and Republicans want to vote for the funding, they want to give President Obama the funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It sounds relatively straightforward.
The addition of the $105 billion package of loans to the IMF brings a whole set of extraneous and contentious issues to a bill that is critically important to our efforts against international terrorism. Speaker Pelosi is allowing this unrelated and divisive issue to interfere with the funding of ongoing combat operations. This is irresponsible leadership, and our troops deserve more than that from Congress.
As I told you earlier, I was in Iraq when we went through this before, and the funding bill passed by just two votes. Vets For Freedom fought for responsible leadership in Congress then, and continues to fight today to give the president and the Secretary of Defense the funding they have requested to execute in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Some Democrats want the extraneous IMF provision included, but demand the removal of the Lieberman/Graham provision blocking the release of the detainee photographs. Everyone agrees, both Republicans and Democrats, that these photos, if released, will help our enemies and endanger our troops engaged in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations around the world. That’s plain English. Even President Obama agrees and has said so publicly. They will be used to recruit new militant extremists, anger previously neutral individuals and groups, and undermine efforts to bring peace to areas battling Islamic fanaticism.
Senators Lieberman and Graham are doing the responsible thing. As leaders they are taking sensible action on what they know (and everyone knows) to be right. It is time for other representatives to do the same. Remove the IMF loans, protect our troops and our strategic efforts by blocking these photographs, and allow the war supplemental to be what it is supposed to be, not a tool for political maneuvering.
NRO The Corner - June 12, 2009
Yesterday I joined Senator Graham, Senator Lieberman, and Representative Conway at the podium of a press conference on the “war supplemental.” Both senators are fighting furiously to make sure that the bill includes the provision that prohibits the release of the photographs allegedly documenting detainee abuse. It was a privilege to participate in the press conference with them. Here is what I said:
I served two tours in Iraq as an officer in a marine infantry battalion. I was a convoy commander in the Haditha area of Al-Anbar province in 2006, so I know from personal experience the kind of impact, both positive and negative, congressional politics can have on the battlefield. I recall two specific incidents. The first was obviously Congressman Murtha’s comments on the so-called Haditha incident. The second was an appropriations bill, similar to this one we are discussing now, that narrowly passed by two votes. These statements damaged troop morale, encouraged our enemies, and unnerved potential friends, and allies among the local population.
Here you have a bill funding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some Democrats oppose it simply because they don’t want to vote for a continuation of these wars, or these battlefronts of the larger war, however you see it, even with President Obama in charge of them. Fine. Other Democrats and Republicans want to vote for the funding, they want to give President Obama the funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It sounds relatively straightforward.
The addition of the $105 billion package of loans to the IMF brings a whole set of extraneous and contentious issues to a bill that is critically important to our efforts against international terrorism. Speaker Pelosi is allowing this unrelated and divisive issue to interfere with the funding of ongoing combat operations. This is irresponsible leadership, and our troops deserve more than that from Congress.
As I told you earlier, I was in Iraq when we went through this before, and the funding bill passed by just two votes. Vets For Freedom fought for responsible leadership in Congress then, and continues to fight today to give the president and the Secretary of Defense the funding they have requested to execute in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Some Democrats want the extraneous IMF provision included, but demand the removal of the Lieberman/Graham provision blocking the release of the detainee photographs. Everyone agrees, both Republicans and Democrats, that these photos, if released, will help our enemies and endanger our troops engaged in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations around the world. That’s plain English. Even President Obama agrees and has said so publicly. They will be used to recruit new militant extremists, anger previously neutral individuals and groups, and undermine efforts to bring peace to areas battling Islamic fanaticism.
Senators Lieberman and Graham are doing the responsible thing. As leaders they are taking sensible action on what they know (and everyone knows) to be right. It is time for other representatives to do the same. Remove the IMF loans, protect our troops and our strategic efforts by blocking these photographs, and allow the war supplemental to be what it is supposed to be, not a tool for political maneuvering.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Heritage Foundation Panel On Iraq
Pete Hegseth and I discuss our experiences as active duty military officers in Iraq at a Heritage Foundation Panel, "The War in Iraq: Views from Two Veterans."
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Who Speaks For Veterans (Part III)
The Washington Times
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
LETTER TO EDITOR: Remember to speak for veterans themselves
LETTER TO THE EDITOR:
The Veterans of Foreign Wars national commander's lengthy, intemperate response ("The VFW speaks for veterans," Letter, Sunday) to my op-ed, "Who speaks for veterans?" (Opinion, April 30), confirms every major point I raised. Glen M. Gardner Jr. focuses exclusively on the benefits and funding that the VFW has helped secure for its members, praises the famously corrupt Rep. John P. Murtha, Pennsylvania Democrat, and defends the Department of Homeland Security's recent anti-veteran report.
My generation of veterans is not willing to trade in our honor for handouts and has no interest in becoming welfare recipients at the expense of our legacy.
There is no excuse for endorsing a congressman who used his position to convict Marines of murder in the court of public opinion before the investigation was completed, as Mr. Murtha did with the eight Marines in Haditha. Mr. Murtha has never apologized for this slander even after the Marines were exonerated and veterans refuse to forgive or forget his betrayal. No sum of money and no quantity of benefits is worth the sacrifice of our values and our pride.
Mr. Gardner's continued defense of the infamous Homeland Security report is hollow and dangerous. This report creates a frame through which veterans and veteran-related incidents will be viewed by the media and subsequently by the public. It creates a false stereotype that will encourage generalizing the inevitable individual incidents to brand veterans as "extremists."
The VFW failed to defend Vietnam veterans from this type of public slander. We will not allow ourselves to be the victims of the same betrayal. We fought and continue to fight, honorably and successfully, and our legacy must reflect that. Veterans' service organizations exist to ensure that happens without compromise. Leaders like Mr. Gardner continue to fail us in this regard.
Mr. Gardner defends his organization's 110-year reputation and brags about its legacy. I wish he would do the same for veterans themselves.
GABE LEDEEN
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
LETTER TO EDITOR: Remember to speak for veterans themselves
LETTER TO THE EDITOR:
The Veterans of Foreign Wars national commander's lengthy, intemperate response ("The VFW speaks for veterans," Letter, Sunday) to my op-ed, "Who speaks for veterans?" (Opinion, April 30), confirms every major point I raised. Glen M. Gardner Jr. focuses exclusively on the benefits and funding that the VFW has helped secure for its members, praises the famously corrupt Rep. John P. Murtha, Pennsylvania Democrat, and defends the Department of Homeland Security's recent anti-veteran report.
My generation of veterans is not willing to trade in our honor for handouts and has no interest in becoming welfare recipients at the expense of our legacy.
There is no excuse for endorsing a congressman who used his position to convict Marines of murder in the court of public opinion before the investigation was completed, as Mr. Murtha did with the eight Marines in Haditha. Mr. Murtha has never apologized for this slander even after the Marines were exonerated and veterans refuse to forgive or forget his betrayal. No sum of money and no quantity of benefits is worth the sacrifice of our values and our pride.
Mr. Gardner's continued defense of the infamous Homeland Security report is hollow and dangerous. This report creates a frame through which veterans and veteran-related incidents will be viewed by the media and subsequently by the public. It creates a false stereotype that will encourage generalizing the inevitable individual incidents to brand veterans as "extremists."
The VFW failed to defend Vietnam veterans from this type of public slander. We will not allow ourselves to be the victims of the same betrayal. We fought and continue to fight, honorably and successfully, and our legacy must reflect that. Veterans' service organizations exist to ensure that happens without compromise. Leaders like Mr. Gardner continue to fail us in this regard.
Mr. Gardner defends his organization's 110-year reputation and brags about its legacy. I wish he would do the same for veterans themselves.
GABE LEDEEN
Who Speaks for Veterans (Part II)
The Washington Times
Sunday, May 3, 2009
LETTER TO EDITOR: The VFW speaks for veterans
In the Op-Ed column "Who speaks for veterans?" (Opinion, Thursday), Vets for Freedom senior fellow Gabe Ledeen maliciously impugned the 110-year-old reputation of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. because he disagrees with the VFW's response to a Department of Homeland Security threat assessment of radical extremist groups.
Had Mr. Ledeen actually read the report for what it was - and not for what he thought it meant - he would have seen that it is a poorly written report that merely states an inescapable fact: Extremist groups want to recruit veterans. The report is nothing more.
He then argues against the VFW Political Action Committee's endorsement of Rep. John P. Murtha, Pennsylvania Democrat, in the last congressional race. Mr. Murtha is certainly known to make foot-in-mouth statements, but he also is a strong advocate for veterans, service members and their families, which is one reason why his constituents have elected him to Congress 19 times.
Mr. Ledeen has the audacity to imply that the VFW needs to recognize its mission "and abandon the petty pandering that continues to stand in the way of real progress and honest representation."
Oh really?
The VFW helped 95,000 veterans last year to recoup $1.2 billion in earned compensation and pension from the government - for free. We awarded $3.5 million in youth scholarships, volunteered 13 million hours in our communities and Veterans Affairs and military hospitals, gave out $2.5 million in grants to help 1,800 military families through temporary financial emergencies, and distributed 11 million free phone cards to deployed and recuperating military personnel.
On Capitol Hill, the VFW was the first veterans organization to support the Bush administration's war-on-terrorism objectives. Our lobbying efforts helped create traumatic injury disability insurance, helped devise a 21st-century GI Bill and provided special payments to Vietnam veterans whose children developed spina bifida. The VFW helped defeat the Obama administration's proposal to bill private health insurance for service-connected care, and it also was instrumental in thwarting previous attempts to create VA enrollment fees and increase prescription co-payments and military Tricare premiums. In addition, the VFW single-handedly got all U.S. airlines to waive third-checked-luggage fees for military travelers.
The VFW takes a back seat to no one. This is why we routinely are asked to testify before Congress on legislation that affects programs for America's veterans and service members.
Never has a Vets for Freedom representative been seated next to us at the witness table, which leads me to restate Mr. Ledeen's original question: "Who speaks for veterans?"
Success in Washington requires being pragmatic about issues without leaving enemies in your wake. I would suggest the next time Vets for Freedom - or one of its members - decides to challenge a military or veterans service organization, he or she does it in person and does not sit on the sidelines using the press as a shield.
GLEN M. GARDNER JR.
National commander
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.
Round Rock, Texas
Sunday, May 3, 2009
LETTER TO EDITOR: The VFW speaks for veterans
In the Op-Ed column "Who speaks for veterans?" (Opinion, Thursday), Vets for Freedom senior fellow Gabe Ledeen maliciously impugned the 110-year-old reputation of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. because he disagrees with the VFW's response to a Department of Homeland Security threat assessment of radical extremist groups.
Had Mr. Ledeen actually read the report for what it was - and not for what he thought it meant - he would have seen that it is a poorly written report that merely states an inescapable fact: Extremist groups want to recruit veterans. The report is nothing more.
He then argues against the VFW Political Action Committee's endorsement of Rep. John P. Murtha, Pennsylvania Democrat, in the last congressional race. Mr. Murtha is certainly known to make foot-in-mouth statements, but he also is a strong advocate for veterans, service members and their families, which is one reason why his constituents have elected him to Congress 19 times.
Mr. Ledeen has the audacity to imply that the VFW needs to recognize its mission "and abandon the petty pandering that continues to stand in the way of real progress and honest representation."
Oh really?
The VFW helped 95,000 veterans last year to recoup $1.2 billion in earned compensation and pension from the government - for free. We awarded $3.5 million in youth scholarships, volunteered 13 million hours in our communities and Veterans Affairs and military hospitals, gave out $2.5 million in grants to help 1,800 military families through temporary financial emergencies, and distributed 11 million free phone cards to deployed and recuperating military personnel.
On Capitol Hill, the VFW was the first veterans organization to support the Bush administration's war-on-terrorism objectives. Our lobbying efforts helped create traumatic injury disability insurance, helped devise a 21st-century GI Bill and provided special payments to Vietnam veterans whose children developed spina bifida. The VFW helped defeat the Obama administration's proposal to bill private health insurance for service-connected care, and it also was instrumental in thwarting previous attempts to create VA enrollment fees and increase prescription co-payments and military Tricare premiums. In addition, the VFW single-handedly got all U.S. airlines to waive third-checked-luggage fees for military travelers.
The VFW takes a back seat to no one. This is why we routinely are asked to testify before Congress on legislation that affects programs for America's veterans and service members.
Never has a Vets for Freedom representative been seated next to us at the witness table, which leads me to restate Mr. Ledeen's original question: "Who speaks for veterans?"
Success in Washington requires being pragmatic about issues without leaving enemies in your wake. I would suggest the next time Vets for Freedom - or one of its members - decides to challenge a military or veterans service organization, he or she does it in person and does not sit on the sidelines using the press as a shield.
GLEN M. GARDNER JR.
National commander
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.
Round Rock, Texas
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